CIA." The weapon was later determined to be a toy pneumatic pistol known as an "air soft" gun. 5 This incident led Horowitz to launch a campaign that resulted in legislation banning or regulating toy guns in California, New York, and twelve other states. 6 Congress also responded by enacting marking requirements for toy weapons to assist in distinguishing them from genuine weapons. 7 Despite these efforts, toy gun incidents continue to occur and state and federal lawmakers continue to grapple with legislative solutions, including prohibiting toy firearms in vehicles and banning their sale at convenience stores, in their efforts to limit tragic occurrences like those described earlier. 8 In fact, twenty-one laws limiting fake guns have been enacted since 1990 and more are pending. 9 The purpose of this Article is to examine existing and proposed federal law regulating the use of toy weapons and to discuss analyses of the limited studies addressing the issue. Part II reviews federal legislation and its implementation by federal agencies. Part III addresses federal court decisions interpreting the use of toy and replica weapons. Part IV discusses the few studies on the toy and replica gun issues. Part V presents the author's analysis of the effectiveness of the legislation. Finally, Part VI questions the sufficiency of existing data that support the flurry of legislative efforts, and offers the author's conclusions regarding additional research that may be required to identify whether a persistent problem is presented.
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION & REGULATIONS

A. The Federal Toy Gun Law
Just over a year after the David Horowitz toy gun scare was aired on national television, 10 the first federal toy gun law was tacked onto the end of the Federal Energy Management Improvement Act of 1988.
11 Section 4 of this Act created 15 U.S.C. § 5001, with the title "Penalties for entering into commerce of imitation 5 Id. 6 
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firearms." 12 This new statute provided: "It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, enter into commerce, ship, transport, or receive any toy, look-alike, or imitation firearm unless such firearm contains, or has affixed to it, a marking approved by the Secretary of Commerce." 13 The statute further required all imitation weapons to have a "blaze orange plug" permanently inserted and recessed no more than six millimeters from the end of the barrel. 14 As is often true, the exceptions to the rule are more interesting than the rule itself. The statute's first exception allowed the Secretary of Commerce to waive the marking requirement for weapons used in the entertainment industry. 15 Additionally, the statute provided the Secretary with the discretion to alter the marking rule "after consulting with interested persons." 16 Further exceptions were made in the definition of "look-alike firearm." This term was "limited to toy guns, water guns, replica non-guns, and air-soft guns firing nonmetallic projectiles," the original of which was manufactured after 1898. 17 As for replicas of firearms, the originals of which were developed before 1898, these were not defined as "look-alike firearms."
18 Lastly, the term was not applied to toy weapons that qualified as BB guns, pellet guns or paintball guns, all of which use air pressure to fire a projectile. 19 Importantly, the new statute required the Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics to conduct a study of the use of such firearms in criminal enterprises and to review police reports regarding their use. 20 The Director of the National Institute of Justice was also required to study the effectiveness of the required blaze-orange markings in combat situations. 21 In an effort to enhance consistent applications, the statute contained a supremacy clause invalidating state and local laws that were inconsistent with the marking requirements provided by federal law or that prohibited the sale of pre-1898 replicas or the traditional BB guns, pellet guns
266
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 12:263 or paintball guns.
22
B. Department of Commerce Regulations
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Department of Commerce instituted a rulemaking proceeding on the issue of the appropriate markings. 23 The Department of Commerce Technology Administration held an open workshop attended by representatives from trade associations, manufacturers and federal agencies, among others, and also received written comments on the issue. 24 Interestingly, the two most frequent comments were (1) that the blaze orange recessed plug marking should be eliminated as ineffective, and (2) that realistic toy weapons should be banned entirely. 25 The Department of Commerce declined to act on either suggestion. The Technology Administration noted that it was awaiting the results of the technical evaluation of marking systems by the National Institute of Justice, and would not eliminate the plug requirement until reviewing that study. 26 As to a complete ban on toy weapons, it was noted that the statute did not provide the Secretary of Commerce with that authority. 27 The result was a final rule set forth in the Federal Code of Regulations requiring lookalike weapons to have either: (1) a blaze orange plug recessed no more than six millimeters from the end of the barrel, 28 or (2) for look-alike firearms that emitted water, light or projectiles, a blaze orange stripe around the circumference of the barrel, 29 or (3) construction of transparent or translucent materials so the contents of the weapon could be identified, 30 or (4) the entire exterior surface coated in bright colors such as red, orange, yellow, green or blue, 31 or (5) the entire exterior surface coated predominately white in combination with another bright color such as red, orange, yellow, green or blue. 32 With relatively minor changes, this is how the regulations read today. 
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C. Additional Legislative Efforts to Control Toy Guns
Despite the enactment of the Federal Toy Gun Law and the promulgation of the marking regulations, the problem continues to be discussed in Congress. The most recent effort was a bill requiring the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") to again address the issue of markings on toy and imitation firearms.
34
Representative Edolphus Towns, who also triggered a General Accounting Office investigation in 2003, 35 sponsored the legislation, which was subsequently referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. 36 The bill is very similar to the existing language in 15 U.S.C. § 5001, but would place the onus of regulating the markings on the CPSC rather than the Secretary of Commerce, 37 and would supersede the Federal Energy Improvement Act of 1988, which established 15 U.S.C. § 5001. 38 This focus on transferring the regulation of toy guns to the auspices of the CPSC can also be found in the Committee on Energy and Commerce's comments on the Consumer Product Safety Modernization Act, where the CPSC was asked to conduct a study regarding injuries and deaths caused by toy guns and urged to adopt a rule providing for more distinctive markings.
III. FEDERAL DECISIONS REGARDING TOY GUNS
Approximately five months prior to the enactment of the federal regulations requiring identifying hues and markings for toy weapons, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that a toy gun may be indistinguishable from a dangerous weapon and found that replica or simulated weapons fall within the federal armed bank robbery statute. 40 Although the toy did not satisfy the definition of a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3), the Ninth Cir- Neither Martinez-Jimenez nor his accomplice carried a genuine weapon during the commission of the bank robbery for which they were indicted. 42 Three eyewitnesses testified, however, that the object Martinez-Jimenez carried by his side as he ordered the employees and customers to lie down on the floor appeared to be a handgun. 43 While the defendant's accomplice admitted that the accused had purchased the toy gun at a department store a few hours before the robbery, neither he nor the defendant wanted the employees to believe that the toy was a genuine weapon nor did either wish for the employees to fear for their lives. 44 Rather, the defendant testified that he carried the toy weapon because it made him feel more secure. 45 As proof of this assertion, the defendant explained that he held the toy weapon down toward his leg to hide it from view of the employees and customers. 46 Notwithstanding the testimony of the defendant and his accomplice, the judge presiding over the bench trial found them both guilty of armed bank robbery and sentenced them accordingly. 47 On appeal, the defendant argued unconvincingly that the toy gun was a "harmless instrumentality of a crime" and not a "dangerous weapon or device." 48 He reasoned that because the plastic toy gun was not an inherently dangerous weapon and because the defendant had never brandished it as such, the toy would not have instilled fear in an average citizen and would not have created a danger of a violent response. 49 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.
50
The appellate court relied almost exclusively on McLaughlin v. 
2009]
TOY GUNS 269
United States, 51 the U.S. Supreme Court's resolution of the evidentiary conflict among the federal circuits regarding whether unloaded weapons were "dangerous" within the meaning of section 2113(d) of the Armed Bank Robbery Statute. 52 In McLaughlin, the Supreme Court held that an unloaded handgun satisfied the definition of "dangerous weapon or device" contained in the statute.
53
Prior to McLaughlin, many circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, interpreted "dangerous weapon or device" to include only loaded operable weapons.
54
McLaughlin placed greater emphasis on the burden that a device used in a bank robbery imposes upon its victims and law enforcement personnel. 55 The Supreme Court reasoned that whether a weapon or device is dangerous encompasses more than just the object's potential to injure people directly. 56 The result is that when a robber creates the appearance of physical danger, the robber has acted sufficiently to subject himself to the more stringent punishment.
57
The Martinez-Jimenez Court adopted this reasoning and analogized the defendant's employment of a toy weapon to Congress's debate over the use of a wooden gun referenced by the McLaughlin Court. 58 Consequently, if an inoperable wooden gun possessed the potential to create a high-risk atmosphere when used in the commission of a crime, the Martinez-Jimenez Court reasoned the same would be true of an inoperable plastic weapon. 59 By defining a toy gun as a dangerous weapon, the Martinez-Jimenez Court expanded the class of dangerous weapons encompassed by the Armed Bank Robbery Statute-a liberal interpretation which was arguably within the intent of Congress. 
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IV. STUDIES CONSIDERING TOY GUN ISSUES
A. The Toy Guns Report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
The Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS"), an agency within the Department of Justice, was identified in 15 U.S.C. § 5001 as the administrative unit charged with conducting the "study of the criminal misuse of toy, look-alike and imitation firearms, including studying police reports of such incidences and reporting on such incidences relative to marked and unmarked firearms." 61 To that end, the BJS awarded a cooperative agreement to the Police Executive Research Forum to conduct the study with the following goals defined: "document[ing] (a) the number of crimes committed by persons using imitation guns and (b) the number of confrontations by police with persons who had imitation guns which were either thought to be or purported to be real." 62 The investigators began framing the methodology for the study by reviewing news stories reporting toy gun incidents. 63 Based on the trends appearing in these reports, the investigators were able to develop a basis for data collection through two methods: a survey and site visits at police agencies.
64
The researchers distributed the questionnaire on police experiences with toy guns to police departments serving populations in excess of 50,000 people, sheriffs' departments with sworn employees numbering in excess of 100, and the primary state police agencies. 65 The survey resulted in a usable response rate of 65.5%. 66 The survey questions targeted police experiences with imitation weapons in situations requiring an officer's use of force, as well as robberies and assaults. 67 The survey defined three categories of imitation weapons: toy guns, replica guns, and BB/pellet/ starter guns. 68 The investigators also conducted site visits at twentyseven separate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of examining imitation weapons incidents in detail to establish trends and characteristics of such encounters. 69 The report found that over a four-year period between 1985 and 1989, 65.5% of the study population reported 5654 robberies 61 
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using imitation guns; robbery investigators interviewed have estimated that approximately fifteen percent of all robberies are committed using imitation guns. 70 During the same period, 8128 assaults were committed using imitation guns, and 31,650 imitation guns were confiscated as a result of their involvement with a crime or other incident. 71 Further, 1128 incidents were reported where an officer threatened to use force, and 252 reported cases involving actual use of force where the officer was confronted with an imitation weapon. 72 Although the site interviews and survey comments indicated that some incidents involved imitation guns with markings, there was insufficient data either to establish the proportion of marked imitation guns versus unmarked imitation guns, or to distinguish between types of imitation weapons.
73
With regard to the blaze orange recessed plug required by 15 U.S.C. § 5001, every officer interviewed by the investigators believed that it was inadequate.
74 Some (officers and investigators) expressed the view that the blaze orange markings could be easily altered with paint. 75 Others noted that the inherent circumstances of a gun-related incident were so stressful for an officer and involved so many factors that a blaze orange plug would not command attention. 76 Finally, standard police firearms training taught all officers to assume that any weapon held by a suspect was real and should be treated as life-threatening. 77 The report concluded that it was difficult to precisely evaluate the seriousness of the problem because the proportion of incidents where an imitation gun was used was relatively small in comparison to the nationwide number of violent crimes and officer-involved shootings, notwithstanding the often tragic circumstances surrounding toy gun incidents. 78 The researchers quoted a police chief participant who suggested that the best solution to the problem was education: the use of violence and threats of force were not acceptable ways to resolve the issues presented. 79 70 Id. at viii. 71 Id. at viii-ix. 72 Id. at ix. 73 Id. at x. 74 Id. at 37. 75 Id. 76 Id. at 38. 77 Id. at 39-40. 78 Id. at 41. 79 Id.
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B. Technical Evaluation of Marking Systems by National Institute of Justice
The second study required by Congress pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 5001 was a requirement that the National Institute of Justice ("NIJ") "conduct a technical evaluation of the marking systems provided for [in the statute] to determine their effectiveness in police combat situations." 80 Upon receiving its statutory mandate, the NIJ began its study by hiring an independent researcher to design an experiment that would "evaluate the various toy gun markings using active police officers in simulated confrontations with armed assailants." 81 The FBI assisted by providing the use of its "Hogan's Alley" training facility, 82 participating in the design of the test and course, and recruiting volunteers from the academy classes. Additional test subjects were volunteers from police departments in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. In all, there were eighty-nine officers who participated in the study.
83
The experiment pitted each test subject police officer against an armed assailant who confronted the officer. The assailant would walk out of an alley onto the sidewalk, turn towards the police officer, raise a weapon and pull the trigger. These confrontations were staged at distances of fifteen and thirty feet.
84
The assailants were armed with any one of the following: an accurate replica 45-caliber pistol; an accurate replica 45-caliber pistol with a blaze orange plug in the barrel; a 45-caliber replica water pistol with a blaze orange band around the barrel; an orange and purple Berretta replica water pistol; a white Berretta replica water pistol; or a transparent green Ingram MAC 11 replica water pistol. These test pistols corresponded with the five marking options under the commerce regulations. 85 The test subject police officers were not told the objective of the experiment, but were instructed to behave as they normally 80 82 Hogan's Alley is a simulated village center complete with houses, a motel, a theater, a post office, a bank, etc., which is used for FBI Academy training in defensive tactics, investigative techniques, and firearm skills. Id. at 3. 83 Id. at 1-2. 84 Id. 85 Id. at 3-4. The unmarked replicas were extremely realistic and firearms instructors from the FBI could not distinguish them from real weapons except by close examination.
would in a street confrontation, with the exception that they would not seek cover to protect themselves. The officers went through the course one at a time. They were instructed that the scenario called for them to be responding to a call from the dispatcher to investigate a report of an armed prowler. They were further told that the suspect would appear from an alleyway and point a weapon at the officer; the police officer was to fire his own revolver if he felt his life was in danger. 86 The people playing the role of assailant recorded the information on whether the officer fired and who fired first. The officers were escorted back to the classroom area for debriefing after undergoing eight separate confrontations with the assailants in both daytime and nighttime conditions.
87
The test results were fairly conclusive with respect to some of the markings and less conclusive as to others. Ninety-eight percent of the officers fired at the assailants holding the "real" weapon. 88 However, 96% fired at seeing the weapon with the orange plug.
89
Seventy-seven percent fired at the gun marked with the orange band around the barrel. 90 Fifty-nine percent fired upon seeing the white colored pistol.
91 Fifty-six percent of the officers fired at the orange and purple pistol, while the clear green pistol had the lowest rate of firing response at thirty-three percent.
92
There were some additional remarks by the officers during the debriefing that were of great interest to the outcome of the study. Most alarming was the fact that 40% of the officers fired at every assailant irrespective of the markings on the weapon being held. 93 Some explained that they were primarily concerned about the aggressive behavior of the assailant and the failure to respond to orders not to move. 94 Some of these officers felt that they should fire on anyone who pointed a weapon and failed to obey commands, regardless of the markings on the weapon, because the assailant could have painted the gun to look like a toy. 95 Several of the officers never saw the orange plug or band during the nighttime 86 Id. at 7. 87 Id. at 9. 88 Id. at 16. 89 Id. 90 Id. 91 Id. 92 Id. 93 Id. at 22. 94 Id. at 22. During the exercise the police shouted "Police! Don't move!" The assailants were instructed to disregard the order and raise the weapon as if to fire. 95 On the positive side, the study suggested that under more relaxed conditions or where the officers were permitted to take cover, the officers may have been less likely to fire. 98 Further, a "learning effect" produced lower shooting rates, which led researchers to conclude that increased familiarity of the officers with the marking systems would lead to fewer decisions to fire. 99 The report concluded that the orange plug marking was a complete failure, while the orange band was only a little better.
100
The other colored markings were somewhat more effective. However, the report observed that the effectiveness of the marking systems would be increased if the police were familiarized with them. 101 Further, private citizens in "at risk" occupations, such as bank tellers, should also be familiarized with the markings.
102
C. GAO Report on Toy Gun Issues
In 2003, the General Accounting Office ("GAO"), 103 the investigatory agency for the Congressional branch, was asked by Representative Edolphus Towns to:
(1) examine crime statistics showing the prevalence of crimes that involved toy guns in some capacity; (2) gather any available information on incidents involving toy guns that have resulted in injuries or deaths, whether or not related to criminal activity; and (3) determine from available literature whether there are any studies examining the long-term impacts that can be attributed to toy gun play by children. 104 96 Id. at 24. 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Id. The learning effect was demonstrated by the fact that the officers were more likely to shoot when confronted with a toy gun during the first trial, but less likely to fire after they became familiar with the setting and the possibility of the appearance of a toy gun. Id. at 27. 100 Id. 101 Id. 102 Id. 
